There are n neigh boring cells in a straight line. A man selects a cell, hides in it and stays there. The searcher examines each cell until he finds the hider. Associated with the examination are a traveling cost dependent on the distance from the last cell examined and an examination cost which varies from cell to cell. The searcher wishes to minimize the expectation of cost of finding the hider, whereas the hider wishes to maximize it. The problem is formulated as a two-person zero-sum game and it is solved.
Introduction
In this paper, it is pointed out that the results in [6] can be generalized to the case where the examination cost of each cell depends Oll the location of the cell and the distances between cells are different but still additive (See (2.1) below). An optimal strategy for Player 1 is unique in spite of the varieties of examination. costs and distances. If the examination cost of each cell is a rational number and if each cell can be subdivided in any way, then our model can be reduced to the model such that the examination cost of each cell does not depend on the location. In such case, the signiflcance of the first generalization, i.e., the dependence of the examination cost, may decrease. But in the case that each cell cannot be subdivided for physical or other reasons, it is still meaningful. This is discussed in Case 1 of Section 3. The proof of the main theorem has become shorter and more elegant than t.hat of [6] , by the uses of the induction on the number of cells and a recursive relation between the values of games.
Gluss [4] analyzed a model in which there are n + 1 neighboring cells in a straight line, labeled from 0 to n in that order. An object is in one of them except Cell 0 with a priori probabilities PI, ... ,Pn· At the beginning of the search the searcher is at Cell 0 that is next to Cell 1. It is required to determine a strategy that minimizes the statistical expectation of the cost of finding the object. Associated with the examination of each cell is the examination cost. The only difference between his model and the previous one (See [1] ) is that while the cost is constant in the latter, it varies through time, that is, a traveling cost is added in the model by Gluss (See [4] ). Gluss treated two cases: PI ~ ... ~ Pn and PI ?: ... ?: Pn. He showed that the latter case is trivial, the searcher should examine each cell in the order of o 1 
For convenience, we let d(i, i) = 0 for all i : 1 ~ i ~ n. There is no possibility of overlooking Player 1, given that the right cell is searched. It is assumed that at the beginning of the search Player 2 is at Cell O. Before searching (hiding) Player 2 (Player 1) must determine a strategy so as to make the cost of finding Player 1 as small (large) as possible.
A (pure) strategy for Player 1 is to choose an element, say i, of N == {1,2,···,n}, which means he determines on hiding in Cell i. This is denoted by i(i EN). The set of all strategies for Player 1 is denoted by N == {l,,2, ... , 1l}. A strategy for Player 2 is defined by a permutation on N. The set of all permutations on N is denoted by M == {l,,2, ... , m}, where m = n!. Thus under a strategy i, Player 2 examined Cells i(1),i(2), ... ,i(n) in this order.
In particular, 1 expresses the identity and m expresses the permutation m( i) = n -i + 1 for 
Thus we have a two-person zero-sum game, which is denoted by (f; N, M). Since both N and M are finite sets this game is expressed by a matrix whose (i,j)-component is f(i,j)(i E Note that (r -£)' = r' -£, and (r + £)' = r' + £ a,s long as these make sense.
Our problem is to solve rn.
3. Optimal Strategies.
The purpose of this section is to give optima.! strategies and examine their properties.
Define a k-vector pk for k = 1", " n inductively as follows:
, n, and pI = (1).
For each k, 1 ~ k ~ n, pk is a probability vector. All components of pn are positive. The following proposition gives properties of pn, which are referred to later.
(ii) Suppose i E Mk, and i(x') = I' for some x. Then
where we let j(O') = I' for convenience.
Proposition 1 (iii) means the probability to the examination cost ratio increases as the distance from Cell ° becomes large. Proposition 1 (ii) is, in a sense, an inverse inequality.
For example, let k = n, and j be such that j(l) == 2 and j(2) = 1. Then from Proposition 
These are shown by (3.1) for k = 2,3 and the definition of b k . Assume the inequalities are true for 2, ... , k -1. We check the case of k.
iY)#2' -
Here from y' < x', we have
where 1.' is defined by : 
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Search Game with Traveling Cost
By the induction hypothesis,
Here by (3.1), Hence Thus,
;=1 ;=1 ;=1 -
Applying the induction hypothesis,
Again applying (3.1), we have
pj reverses the order of examination under j. Thus, if j is expressed as an n-vector, that is,
(1)J· W~ can assume i is as follows: 
12 13 Figure 2 .
If j E M is h-peaked then pj is also h-peaked. In particular I-peaked strategies are interesting since less traveling costs ~e required under them. Thus let M1 be the set of all I-peaked strategies of Player 2. The number of all elements of M 1 is 2n-1. Define a 2 k -1 -vector qk for k = 1", ., n inductively as follows: For k = 2" .. , n, (3.4) and for k = 1" .. , n -1,
I+a -l+a-and aD = +00. (3, 5) Extend a 2 k -1 -vector l to a k!-vector q*k by adding the zero-vector of dimension k!_2k--1.
That is, q*k = (qk, 0). Here the components in the first half and in the second half of qk correspond to I-peaked strategies such that j(I') = I' and pj(1') = I' respectively. The zero-vector corresponds to other strategies (S~ (3.8) below). -Our main result is :
Theorem 3. pn is the unique optimal strategy for Player I. q*n is an optimal strategy for Player 2. The value v n can be calculated by the recursive relation: For k = 1"" , n, (3.6) or alternatively, (3.7) Theorem 3 gives only an optimal strategy for pla.yer 2, and it says nothing about the set of all optimal strategies for Player 2. 
K. Kikuta
It is interesting to give properties of pn and q*n. From (3.4) we have for i E Mi and
(3.8) Further if dei, i + 1) = d for i = 0"", n -1, then the model reduces to the case in [6] . From By (3.5), a ni --+ +00 and a
Consequently-qj > ° implies j(I) = i since i is I-peaked. From (3.6), v k --+ +00 for k 2 n -i + 1.
Case 3. dei, i + 1) --+ +00 for some i.
where 0 is the i-dim. zero-vector. By (3.5),
Proof of the theorem.
In this section we prove the theorem by the induction on k.
Lemma 4. For k = 1"" ,n, and for all pE pk,
Proof: First we note that (4.1) holds when k' = 1, observing the right-hand side of (4.1) is den -1, n) + c(n) by (3.5). We show (4.1) for k, assuming (4.1) for k - 
by the induction hypothesis and (3.5). Here j' E M1-
, k
For k = 1"" ,n, and for any i E NIl'
Proof: First we note that (4.2) holds when k = 1, observing the right-hand side of
Here io = 0'. Assume first il > I' and i' ~ 2'. Then
where j'(z') = j((z -1)') for 2 ~ z ~ k, and j' E M~-l. Furthermore, it is easy to see for
• r = 0, :-: . , y + C -
where i(z') = i(z') for 2 ~ z ~ k, and i E M~-l.
Search Game with T"rveling Cost
Furthermore, for r = 1, ... ,Y + 1,
Proof: First we note that Lemma 6 holds when k = 1, observing both sides become
. We show Lemma 6 for k, assuming it holds for k -1.
where jl(ZI) = j(ZI) if z :::; x-I, and
Here, n~te that-- 
for s = 1" .. , n -1 and t = 2, ... , n. Here for t =: 2, ... , n, n-I .
f(1,j[2]) at
Here, note that f(1,j [2] a t -a n _2 at -a n -2
. . .
at -a n _2 at·
Furthermore for u = 2" .. , n -1 and t = n + 1 -u,"', n, We show inductively that for u = 2" ", n -1, r-
